

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.242
22 February 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

(Canada)

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OF MICHIGAN
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66-07646

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mrs. H. SKOWRONSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. I. VIRGIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. A. A. OZADOVSKY
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALILAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the two hundred and forty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): Since I have not had the opportunity of doing so before, I should like first of all to express my profound condolences to the representatives of India, and Nigeria on the grievous loss sustained by their countries through the deaths of their Prime Ministers, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. In addition to the loss of these two great twentieth-century statesmen, India has also lost an eminent scientist, Dr. Homi Bhabha. I would ask the representatives of the two countries to transmit to their Governments the Mexican delegation's feelings of sympathy and solidarity.

I should also like to extend a most cordial welcome to the representatives of Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Poland, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, who are beginning or renewing their collaboration with us here; and I wish them every success in their work with the Committee.

Finally, I wish to express our pleasure at having in our midst Mr. Spinelli, the Director-General of the European Office of the United Nations and Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

As this is the first time that I have spoken at the present session, and as I do not wish my silence to be construed as disapproval or disparagement of what has been said by previous speakers, let me say at once that the Mexican delegation is ready to co-operate with other delegations, with the utmost zeal and enthusiasm, in carrying out meticulously the task again entrusted to us by the United Nations General Assembly. To be more precise, it is a triple assignment stemming from three United Nations General Assembly resolutions (ENDC/161): the achievement of "substantial progress" on the question of general and complete disarmament (A/RES/2031 (XX)); the drafting of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments (A/RES/2032 (XX)); and, last but certainly not least, the drafting of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028 (XX)).

Each of these three subjects has an equal claim on our attention and our responsibility. In regard to the first, the Mexican delegation regrets what Lord Chalfont called the regrettable "gap" in our deliberations, widening with every day that passes and resulting from the alarming fact that, as he pertinently

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observed, "this Committee has not engaged in discussions on general and complete disarmament for over eighteen months" (ENDC/PV.237, p.12). This is indeed a most regrettable gap in our principal task, and it is to be hoped that we can close it as soon as possible and return at length to the problem which we have left pending for so long, that of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, at the same meeting rightly called this a "crucial question", pointing to the agreement in principle already existing in this matter between the great nuclear Powers and their allies and intimating that the difference between the two sides --

"... here relates to how quickly reductions can be made and how they are to be verified; how they can be applied without upsetting the principle agreed upon, that no measure of disarmament should create an advantage for any State or group of States" (ibid, pp.22, 23).

This does not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle, and we must therefore try to overcome it on a suitable occasion, combining imagination with goodwill in the search for new approaches.

In regard to collateral measures of disarmament, the Mexican delegation is likewise willing to consider sympathetically any measures which seem likely to create a favourable climate for bringing about disarmament, and of course those calculated to lessen international tension immediately, regardless of which Power proposes them -- in other words, with the utmost impartiality. For example, we have in mind a mutually-agreed suspension, subject to the necessary guarantees, of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, use of the materials for peaceful purposes and after that a progressive decrease in such production. We have also in mind the categorical condemnation in an international treaty of the use of nuclear weapons, and their absolute proscription under the law of nations. I wish to stress that I mention these measures purely as examples, without ruling out discussion of any others which might help to fulfil the purposes I have mentioned.

Nevertheless, our main attention at this juncture should be concentrated on the very serious question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in accordance with our clear-cut directives from the United Nations we must embody

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in a treaty covering all the points, without exception, specified in the pertinent General Assembly resolution (A/RES/2028 (XX)). In keeping with those directives, it should be a treaty with no gaps or loop-holes which might make for violations of any kind, direct or indirect. It must also establish an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; and it must contain provisions which ensure its effectiveness, thus constituting a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. Lastly, it must specify the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories -- which, incidentally, is precisely what we are trying to achieve in Latin America.

Among these "main principles" -- as this General Assembly resolution calls them -- of the non-proliferation treaty which it is our task to prepare here and now, there is one which is of particular concern to the non-nuclear Powers, and hence to Mexico: a reasonable or acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It reflects the legitimate anxiety of the non-nuclear Powers when they ask how they are to be assured that they will not be the victims of nuclear attack once they have absolutely renounced the possession of such weapons, whether they have the capacity to produce them or not. Hence this question of balance is identical with, or at any rate implies or presupposes, the other question of the so-called guarantees which the non-nuclear Powers must unquestionably receive if they are to take such a serious step as that of limiting their sovereignty and restricting their security.

Nothing illustrates this concern of the non-nuclear Powers so much as the fact that it has been not only expressed, but spelt out with concrete suggestions, ever since the subject came up for discussion at the last session of the General Assembly. Referring to the various statements on the subject made then, I should like to quote our colleague, Mr. Obi, the Nigerian representative, who has confirmed in this Committee what was said in New York on 19 October 1965:

"An indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is, therefore, a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to

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use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers under any circumstances whatever, or to threaten to use them. So long as non-nuclear States have the possibility of having nuclear weapons used against them, so long as this fear hangs over them like a sword of Damocles, so long as they are threatened with nuclear weapons or subjected to nuclear blackmail, then so long will pressures build up in the countries of non-nuclear Powers to acquire nuclear weapons; pressures which even the most responsible and peace-loving governments would find difficult to resist for very long." (A/C.1/PV.1356, pp.27-31; ENDC/PV.235, pp. 31,32)

Fully in accordance with the above, as we see it -- subject of course to rectification by either author -- is the proposal contained in the message sent to our Committee on 1 February 1966 by Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and reading as follows:

"In order to facilitate agreement on the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet Government declares its willingness to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory." (ENDC/167, pp. 2, 3)

Our impression that there is complete concordance between the Nigerian delegation's proposal and that made by the highest authority of the Soviet Union is confirmed by the welcome that Mr. Ijewere, Chairman of the Nigerian delegation in this Committee, gave to this new Soviet proposal on Thursday 3 February, adding:

"We are also convinced that the proposal, if acceptable to other nuclear Powers, would go a long way towards facilitating the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty which would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons."

(ENDC/PV.237, p.34)

For our part, we should like to add that we interpret the Soviet proposal as an undertaking to respect the legal status of any denuclearized zones which may be created anywhere in the world, through regional or sub-regional agreements, and consequently as an encouragement to conclude such agreements as soon as possible.

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The Mexican Delegation ventures to express the hope that the Soviet delegation may see fit, at an opportune moment, to give us the actual text of this important additional article of the Soviet draft treaty.

Lastly, still on the subject of guarantees, we cannot overlook another significant declaration, that made by President Johnson and similarly contained in the message which he sent to our Committee on 27 January:

"Meanwhile, the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail." (ENDC/165, p.2)

Unlike Mr. Kosygin, President Johnson does not specify whether he intends that the above promise shall be included among the articles of the non-proliferation treaty. The decision naturally lies with him alone, and nothing can be further from our thoughts than to seek to interfere in even the smallest degree with the course of action which, here as in other matters, a sovereign State decides to follow. We shall merely point out that our attitude will necessarily differ according to which hypothesis is valid. If the promise should turn out to be nothing more than what it actually is at present, a unilateral declaration, then I do not see how it can be discussed in a body concerned with multilateral negotiations. If, on the other hand, it should be proposed to us as an additional article in the treaty -- that is to say, as an undertaking to be assumed by all nuclear Powers -- we shall then say what we think about it.

In the meantime, we listened with great interest and particular attention to the interpretation given by the Italian representative to President Johnson's proposal when he said:

"I do not think that this is the kind of 'protective guarantee pact' which some non-aligned countries, rightly jealous of their own political situation as non-committed States, do not wish to see established, in order thus to be able to maintain their complete independence. It seems to me that, on the contrary, what President Johnson's message contains is an autonomous and unilateral promise of support and assistance of which an attacked country could, in accordance with its needs and desires, either avail itself or not." (ENDC/EV.239, p.12)

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With regard to what the same speaker said about the negative character of the Soviet proposal (ibid.), we agree that this is true in the literal and formal sense, so that it is in fact a non facere obligation; but we should like to point out that very lofty values affecting individuals or communities are safeguarded, as they must be, by obligations of this type. For instance, is not the supreme value of human life safeguarded by the simple precept "Thou shalt not kill"?

To round off this question of the balance that must exist between the obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers -- even though this is a separate item of our agenda which we must take up in due course -- the Mexican delegation feels obliged to point out here and now that in its view an absolutely essential condition of such a balance must be the final cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in any environment whatever. This, in our view, is the minimum at which non-nuclear countries can and must aim. Otherwise we shall merely have stopped what we have sometimes called here horizontal proliferation, or the transfer of nuclear weapons from countries that possess them to those that do not, while vertical proliferation would be continuing as at present, with the vast increase in nuclear weapon stocks through underground testing which is still allowed, in order to develop newer and more deadly weapons.

We fully realize that there will have to be a special treaty, or an additional protocol or supplement to the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/10C/Rev.1) -- or whatever it is decided to call the instrument -- to cater for the ban on underground testing of nuclear weapons. That is the normal course of events, and we do not ask that this stipulation should be inserted specifically in the non-proliferation treaty, although technically there is nothing to prevent it. All we are concerned with is to point out the close link between the two agreements and their parallel course. As the old diplomatic adage puts it, Simul stabunt, simul cadent.

Another point which we feel we should make clear at once, because of the importance we ascribe to it, is that we shall certainly not be content to accept, in place of a genuine and effective non-proliferation treaty, a "simple non-

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dissemination treaty", as it has been called in the United Nations and indeed here: a treaty merely containing mutual obligations binding both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, the former not to transfer nuclear weapons and techniques and the latter not to accept them. In our view such a treaty, by maintaining silence on this point, would leave the countries possessing the capacity to do so completely free to produce nuclear weapons with their own resources, and would thus not solve the problem with which we are faced.

Indeed, the greatest danger, as is clearly evident from the copious literature on the subject, is not that the present nuclear Powers -- which are perfectly satisfied with their monopoly -- may give nuclear weapons to others, but rather that various States already possessing the necessary resources may sooner or later join the "atomic club" through their own efforts. There is already a long list of candidates or aspirants to nuclearity; at the last meeting the Soviet representative gave an estimate of thirteen (ENDC/PV.241, p.22), and he certainly was not basing his statement exclusively on information from his own country. Hence, in the Mexican delegation's view, we must not swerve from our present purpose or snap at easy compromise solutions, which would really be tantamount to failure, but rather make efforts to achieve the only possible objective -- what the Indian representative so aptly called (ENDC/PV.240, p.19) a "genuine and comprehensive" treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Since in addition to the fundamental directives of the General Assembly we have also had since last year the draft treaties on non-proliferation submitted by the delegations of the United States (ENDC/152) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/164), the Mexican delegation would not object, if the Committee so desires, to embarking at once on a comparative study, article by article, of these two draft treaties -- without prejudice of course to the continuation of the general debate on this subject, and subject to the freedom which has always existed in this Conference for each member at any moment to say what he wishes on any subject he chooses. That is, fortunately, the guiding principle of our rules of procedure.

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To ensure that neither operation should hinder the smooth course of the other, the Mexican delegation proposed on Thursday 3 February (ENDC/PV.237, p.36) that the third weekly meeting suggested by the United Kingdom delegation (ibid., p.11) should be a meeting of the drafting committee proposed by the Italian delegation (ENDC/PV.236, p.8). It felt that such a delicate task as a comparative study of the two draft treaties should be carried out in a strictly private and informal atmosphere, without any record of the preliminary and informal exchanges of views. In confirming this proposal, which, as we see it, is a conciliatory one and would make for harmony, we declare our willingness once again to enter wholeheartedly into the substance of the topic before us.

In undertaking a comparative study of the two draft treaties, my delegation assumes that each and every member of the Committee shall be completely free to formulate any kind of amendment they think fit -- deletions, additions or substitutions -- or to submit new proposals or counter-proposals. We also feel, in conformity with the Indian delegation's view on the subject (ENDC/PV.240, pp. 16 et seq.), that we must take constant care that any joint draft produced by us is in line with the directives given us by the United Nations -- the five points laid down in resolution A/RES/2028 (XX) (ENDC/161), which are for us, as it were, the "Five Commandments" of non-proliferation. But once all this is clearly understood, we see no reason why the two drafts should not be taken at once as basic working documents.

In this task of revision or amendment, as the case may be, of the working documents at our disposal so far, we earnestly hope that the delegations of the countries submitting the draft treaties will go along with us. Since both the United States and the Soviet drafts were submitted some time before resolution A/RES/2028 (XX), there might well be a number of discrepancies that could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time. But as both countries voted in favour of the resolution, along with all the other countries, it seems reasonable to suppose that they would not have any objection to revising their own drafts in the light

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of the guiding principles laid down by the United Nations. In this way our work will not reflect any antagonism between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers but will represent a friendly and constructive joint effort to embody in the treaty the clauses which have likewise arisen from mutual agreement.

This means, of course, that it is of the greatest urgency -- indeed the General Assembly resolution stresses this, using the words "urgent" and "early" -- for us to conclude rapidly, if possible at the current session, the non-proliferation treaty which the world is expecting from us, so that at least the present balance of terror will not be replaced by an imbalance and by the unrestrained irruption of terror into all aspects of our daily life. Yet either that or the final catastrophe is what will happen if tomorrow the number of members of the dreaded "atomic club" rises from five to ten, and perhaps a great many more. With the increase in the number of fire hazards -- or, better, of volcanoes -- the chances will also increase that carelessness, lack of control or madness may at any moment spark off the universal conflagration.

In obedience to man's instinct to cling desperately to anything he thinks will stop him from falling into the abyss, we are reassured again and again that the number of nuclear Powers will not, at any rate for the present, go beyond five. It is alleged, for example, that it is not such a bad thing, after all, that nuclear weapons should be in the hands of the States which have the right to permanent seats on the Security Council; it is even believed that this coincidence will be immutable and permanent. But, as has been rightly pointed out, that argument cuts both ways for those who consider that, in the perfectly feasible hypothesis of a revision of the Charter, the possession of nuclear weapons would presumably be the price to be paid for permanent membership of the Security Council. Naturally, a candidate would have to be able to pay the admission fee, and that in itself would constitute additional pressure for a review of the Charter. Consciously or unconsciously, this line of thought must surely have occurred to more than one statesman.

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At other times the experts in these matters try to lull us by telling us that the production of nuclear weapons is a costly, difficult and lengthy business. For us, however, the most important factor is not the technology involved, but the will -- the decision which this or that country, more or less nearing the stage of being able to produce atomic weapons -- and there seem to be quite a number of such countries -- may take one fine day to embark on that course, if it should become convinced that there is no other way of achieving security. Once these countries set in motion the industrial processes consequent on such a decision, they are not likely to subscribe to a non-proliferation treaty; unless we propose it to them -- now, and not later -- in such a way that the fatal option is averted at once. And let us be frank: the most persuasive argument in favour of this option would be the failure of our Committee. Truly the responsibility on our shoulders is a terrible one.

It is precisely because we wish to stop this fateful option in time -- or, perhaps it would be better to say, to see that it is exercised in favour of a final and saving renunciation -- that we in Latin America are so determined to denuclearize our region as soon as possible. How, then, could we fail to recognize as equally urgent something which, although in a different context and by different means, is designed substantially to achieve the same goal?

Never, it seems to us, have the hopes of the world hung on this Conference as they do now. Both the hopes and the cares are manifest in the messages we have received directly or through the Secretary-General from the Heads of the major political and moral Powers of the world: President Johnson (ENDC/165), Mr. Kosygin (ENDC/167), Prime Minister Wilson (ENDC/166), and His Holiness Pope Paul VI (ENDC/163) -- the last-named using the simple title of "expert in humanity", the sole capacity, as he himself said, in which he appeared before the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. We refuse to believe that we shall this time disappoint so many high and urgent hopes.

Because of its awareness of all this, the Mexican delegation is happy to state that Mexico's position will be conciliatory and constructive, as in the past, and that we shall not place any obstacle in the path of such agreement as

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may result from our discussions; rather we shall make every effort -- not lightheartedly, but as a duty -- to ensure that the treaty to be drafted by us embodies the general principles agreed upon in the United Nations.

We were surprised to read in the Press recently that it is the non-aligned countries in this Committee which are placing obstacles in the path of the speedy conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Mexican delegation, the only one for which I can speak, energetically rejects the charge, at any rate as far as Mexico is concerned. The falsity of this imputation in regard to us is surely self-evident in the light of all I have said; and I wish solemnly to place it on record.

Mr. ABERRA (Ethiopia): On the occasion of its first intervention the Ethiopian delegation would like to share the grief of the Indian delegation on the passing away of their late national leader, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. Though from a human point of view we lament the loss of this great statesman, his conquest of war and his death in peace in Tashkent, over the ridges of Kashmir, will live to shine in history in the same way as the glorious cultural achievements of Tamerlane in Samarkand. We hope that India's contribution to peace will be kept alive by the examples of its late Prime Minister and its late distinguished atomic scientist, Dr. Homi Bhabha.

The Ethiopian delegation also shares with sympathy the condolences that have been extended to the Nigerian delegation at our meetings on the tragic death of one of Africa's outstanding statesmen, the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Great as he was as an African personality, he stood for the protection of the human personality from suppression by any type of regionalism; and his words to that effect, as he addressed the audience in Africa Hall on the occasion of the signing of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, will ring in the memory of Africans as they toil to uphold the human values that are so essential for our task in hand.

Our sympathy also goes to the United States delegation on the loss that has just befallen them by the passing away of Admiral Nimitz, a hero of the Pacific during the Second World War in the cause of the alliance for peace.

The Ethiopian delegation would like to join the delegations that have preceded it in congratulating the Soviet delegation on the successful soft landing

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of Luna 9 on the moon; and it is our fervent prayer that the same spirit of peaceful endeavour that has guided the many diplomatic and scientific conferences on outer space will guide this Committee to make a soft landing on the target of general and complete disarmament set for it by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Before coming to the issues that are of immediate concern to us, may I be allowed to thank the many delegations that have welcomed me to this august assembly of Powers in terms so markedly friendly and gracious? It is indeed a pleasure for me to meet again my colleagues from my service days in Eastern and Western Europe, and similarly my associates from the Vienna Atomic Energy conferences, and the Peace Conference on the Far East held in Geneva in 1954. May I be permitted to say how much I appreciate this renewed encounter, and that I look forward to our fruitful co-operation in helping the Powers to pacify their nuclear monsters?

I should also like to express my thanks for the unvoiced yet ever-ready help and welcome I have received from the representatives of the United Nations here, with many of whom I had the pleasure of working during the summer session of the United Nations Trade and Development Board. Having come recently from that meeting, I cannot fail to bring to the notice of this Committee the urgent call of mankind's majority in the developing nations for disarmament and the subsequent release of the funds that are now consumed by the arms race. In this context, I should like to extend the appreciation of my delegation for the work of the ten experts that were appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate the economic and social consequences of disarmament. The joint report calling for international co-operation to start immediate steps for disarmament (E/3593/Rev.1), which experts coming from so many and so widely different political and economic persuasions were able to prepare, and which was the basis of United Nations resolution 1837 (XVII), lies on our table as an outstanding example of international co-operation and dedication to the needs of humanity.

The history of disarmament negotiations, especially during the days of the League, is a sad commentary on the intransigence of the Powers that were; and the last note of pathetic resignation was read to us by the Indian representative from the letter of Mr. Nehru to his daughter, the present Prime Minister of India (ENDC/PV.240, p.20).

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The idea basic to the League, which was given the name of collective security, that war -- and hence the armaments of war -- is a crime against humanity, was buried in these very chambers. As the world knows, in the particular case of the fascist aggression in Ethiopia, the cry of my country was unheard; the terms of the Covenant were broken; the request for help was unanswered. We remember the voices of Benes and Titulescu in particular -- small voices that were battling for collective security. But the Powers preferred to give no heed to their warnings and left the matter to be settled by the parties, as if there were any need to come to the League if it could have been settled outside. I refer to that tragic part of our history only to draw strength for our future task, so that no mistakes are repeated and no covenants broken.

The history of this Committee shows that we were born out of the agreement of the Powers, endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations; and now we are charged with this paramount task of putting a summary stop to the possibility of a nuclear conflagration of a global magnitude, by addressing ourselves to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. Therefore it is necessary to follow the principles that have been given as guide-lines so that our negotiations are conducted with impartial objectivity and universal application.

As one of the non-aligned nations which submitted to the Committee the Joint Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/158), we feel happy that the United Nations General Assembly has deemed fit to express satisfaction with our intervention; and we need only remember that our contribution is complementary to the positive approaches of the two Power blocs in presenting the Committee with the two draft treaties on non-proliferation (ENDC/152, 164). Hence any progress of our work in the general field of disarmament, and in particular on partial and collateral measures, will depend on the joint agreement of the representatives here, from which will emanate the weight that it may carry among the different groupings in the world today.

It is abundantly clear to my delegation that the solution to our problems of disarmament in general, and non-proliferation in particular, is closely dependent on the solution of major political problems. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Moscow test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the Washington-Moscow communication line (ENDC/97), certain measures of agreement can be hoped for which may reduce tension and the risk of nuclear war by accident.

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The Ethiopian delegation received with great hope and appreciation the messages sent by His Holiness Pope Paul VI (ENDC/163), the President of the United States (ENDC/165), the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (ENDC/166), and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (ENDC/167). Much of the hopeful atmosphere that prevails at our meetings is due to the urgency and concern with which they have addressed themselves to the problem of solving the nuclear deadlock. The Ethiopian delegation regrets that its immediate neighbours in this Chamber -- the French delegation -- are absent and do not hear their call to the responsibilities of humanity.

In the statements communicated to this Committee by President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin in forwarding their draft treaties, one is happy to find so many converging elements, except the major issue of the problem in Central Europe. I shall not take the precious time of the Committee to dwell further on the semantics of the terms used, but it can be seen clearly that non-proliferation within a group as much as outside the group is the intention of the Soviet draft, whereas the draft of the United States safeguards from independent national control.

The Ethiopian delegation recognizes the vital importance of the solution of this problem for the security and confidence of Central Europe; and it is incumbent upon the great Powers to search for solutions that will bring a peaceful settlement in Central Europe as a key region in the attainment of peace in the world, in the context of the responsibilities they have inherited in the post-war period. The way to a breakthrough may well be within the framework of disarmament negotiations leading to full representation and responsibility by the people that have now no voice while the issues vital to them are being settled. The first principle prescribed by the United Nations resolution for non-proliferation is that there should be no loop-holes in the treaty, and if we are to avoid loop-holes through which the world may turn into warring nuclear Leviathans, then we must make the necessary leap forward towards adequate international safeguards and controls.

The Ethiopian delegation has studied with interest the ideas for a moratorium with which the non-nuclear countries are asked to fetter themselves. We do not see the merits of this unilateral declaration, with whatever vague demands non-nuclear countries are supposed to make in exchange for their nuclear suicide. We do not see how non-nuclear Powers can enforce an engagement when nuclear Powers

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themselves have often found they are powerless in face of nuclear threat and trespass. We can only see such a moratorium giving licence for a nuclear build-up to those who are out for nuclear escalation; and as long as they are out of reach of international judgement or control we can only expect an abuse of the moratorium, like Hitler's abuse of the Locarno moratorium.

It is therefore evident to my delegation that any fair agreement between the non-nuclear and the nuclear Powers must be based on the second principle of the United Nations resolution: that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities. However laudable and chivalrous may be the guarantees embodied in the offers of the nuclear Powers against the State that first uses nuclear weapons -- or the guarantees against nuclear blackmail -- it is only fair that it be understood that the new and old nations of the world, which have maintained or regained independence at the cost of great sacrifices, would need an independent judgement before accepting a "first-user" guarantee, and similarly would need a prior agreement on the principles of the conditions before accepting protection. These are some of the basic considerations that have to be taken into account in the framing of mutual responsibilities.

It is undoubtedly very difficult to ask a nation to sign a treaty of non-proliferation -- which, in fact, means forgoing its vital security considerations -- if the prospects of disarmament, denuclearization and reduction of armaments are not effectively solved by the big Powers. This is naturally more vexing to those who, either independently or in alliance, are on the verge of becoming nuclear Powers. It would therefore seem that more than guarantees are expected if an effective pledge for armament reduction is required.

Mr. Trivedi of India stated on 12 August 1965:

"No international treaty can, therefore, be acceptable which issues dictates only to non-nuclear countries ... particularly when the countries possessing nuclear weapons do not assume any prior commitments themselves."

(ENDC/PV.223, p.15)

Such a commitment to reduction, in the opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, will have to follow on the third criterion for denuclearization, which the Prime Minister of Canada described on 3 June 1963, saying that denuclearization --

"... should be consistent with the accepted principle that no disarmament measure should create a unilateral advantage for any State or group of States."

(Mr. Abera, Ethiopia)

The third principle which we are asked to apply in our consideration of the non-proliferation treaty is whether it is a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. In their Joint Memorandum the group of eight non-aligned nations in this Committee expressed their position that the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. They stated further:

"The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery". (ENDC/158)

In the opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, this does not in itself diminish the magnitude of the non-proliferation problem, nor does it lessen the urgency of concluding a non-proliferation agreement. What it does say is that we should put non-proliferation in the right perspective if we are to have a joint strategy for its achievement. Perhaps some of us are conscious of the anxiety of the public in the world for immediate results -- and this anxiety is in many ways understandable. Yet we must realize that non-proliferation has world-wide consequences, and cannot be achieved without great toil, patience and sacrifice by all concerned.

We are living at a time when man is caught in the grip of the race between his constructive and destructive powers. To glory in some of the achievements while ignoring the possibilities of a conflagration would be to make a parody of the situation. We are happy to hear that the safety fuses in the Spanish nuclear incident performed as they were intended to perform. But what would have happened if they had not done so? Do we have in mind the picture sometimes given us by the experts that the effect of a one-megaton bomb is equal to bombing by 1,000 planes for fourteen consecutive years? Can we imagine that "The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of supersonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a university" (ENDC/165, p.3), as has been communicated to us by the President of the United States? What are we to think of this colossal waste when, according to United Nations experts, \$120 thousand million are spent on the armaments race, a figure that is estimated as being equal to the entire national income of all the underdeveloped countries?

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

That is the picture with regard to material waste. But what about the annihilation of human life that may be caused by proliferation? We are faced with a situation today in which China is outside the United Nations. France, as has been stated, is not present here. Indonesia has decided to withdraw from the United Nations, and many of the divided countries in the world in the marginal regions of tension on the East-West line are outside the United Nations. Is this a picture of the regions where the people would be ready to forgo armament? One feels that this would be asking too much. Thus the problem has to be settled at the centre, starting with the present nuclear Powers making a fresh alliance for peace and agreeing on graduated progress towards disarmament. Hence the necessary connexion between non-proliferation and general and complete disarmament in the time-table of our operations.

In the fourth principle of the resolution the United Nations asks for acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. There appears to be a law that the requirement of collateral measures that may be acceptable for the needs of general and complete disarmament is inversely proportionate to the acceptable and workable measures provided to ensure the effectiveness of the agreements. It will certainly contribute to the progress of our work to balance these measures in order to build up the confidence required for the faithful execution of our mission.

Here I should like to mention an important and no less urgent question that has been entrusted to us by the international community -- namely, the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161). This is perhaps an item that the United Nations refers to as a measure related to non-proliferation.

It is now nearly three years since the Moscow test-ban Treaty was concluded, but no progress has been made to make it comprehensive, and particularly to make it cover underground tests. Again we regret that France did not see fit to sign this treaty. Our delegation is concerned about the dismay this has created in shaking confidence in this treaty and in establishing new arenas for nuclear expansion.

(Mr. Aberre, Ethiopia)

We are not unaware of the question of detection and identification of underground explosions. We are happy to learn that modern technology has advanced to the point that it can identify underground explosions to the extent of a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and above. We anticipate, with hope, further acceleration of such studies; and we, for our part, look forward to our contribution through the joint research of the countries belonging to the Organization of African Unity. It was in that sense that my delegation subscribed to the Joint Memorandum of the non-aligned nations (ENDC/159), which points in particular to the need for an exchange of scientific and other information by the nuclear Powers with respect to detection and identification techniques, and in general to the need for international co-operation in this field.

In this spirit we welcome and appreciate the proposal of the Swedish delegation for an international "detection club" (ENDC/154). An agreement on such co-operation might perhaps serve as the basis for a comprehensive test-ban treaty such as the one envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2032 (XX). It seems appropriate here to remark that the Ethiopian delegation has noted with regret the lack of effective co-operation between this United Nations Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, which we believe is well prepared to expand its activities in order to extend us technical help in our task.

We now come to the fifth, and last, principle, which safeguards the right of States to take single or collective measures on denuclearization. The phenomenon of denuclearization is a regional collective endeavour of paramount importance to national security in the absence of a collective international security system giving effective guarantees against aggression. With the permission of the delegations of the United Arab Republic and Nigeria, I should like to recall the joint resolution which their countries, together with Ethiopia, sponsored at the meeting of the African Heads of State or Government and which culminated in the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa that stands as a landmark of progress to peace (A/5975). We are well aware that certain remnants of colonialism and racial prejudice may bring the nuclear danger to Africa; and for this very reason we feel that it is the urgent task of this Committee to come to terms with the perilous world of rockets in which we live.

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

Africans cannot tolerate the use of their continent as an experimental wilderness, and for this reason we have tried everything in our power to persuade the Government of France to halt these tests. We are aware that the absence of France from this Committee is taken by it as giving it a licence for nuclear proliferation that it may even extend to its associates, thus halting the denuclearization process that has been started in Africa.

It is of great significance to us that France abstained from voting on the United Nations resolution on non-proliferation (A/RES/2028 (XX)) that has been sent to us. It is also significant that France abstained from the vote on the test-ban treaty resolution (A/RES/2032 (XX)), and that it was the only country, during the twentieth session of the General Assembly, not to vote for the convening of a world conference on disarmament (A/RES/2030 (XX)). This singular intransigence no doubt has its own motives. We cannot fail to remind France that the walk-out of Germany and Italy from the League of Nations only spelled calamity for those nations. We therefore call France back to the Briand Pact, to the Peace of Versailles, away from its aspirations for a force de frappe, to regain its seat as la force inspiratrice before its example becomes the seed of its own destruction.

We are no less apprehensive about the abstentions of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal from the vote on the resolution on non-proliferation. The danger of proliferation is perhaps even greater when we survey the regions of the exposed nuclear Powers. We cannot fail to notice the People's Republic of China sitting like the Unknown Sphinx among the pyramids of the nuclear Powers.

This Committee has been asked to solve the problem of the security of nations and in particular to check the outbreak of war, especially nuclear war. We have the destiny of millions of people in our hands, people at war or on its brink, whose life and death depend on the measures we may be party to undertaking at this table. We are, in fact, beset with Solomonic problems: To whom should collective security be given? Who are the mothers of adversity and who are the fathers of aggression? All the ideological, social and economic differences that have led to the outbreak of conflicts will be affected by the sweeping measures of a non-proliferation treaty.

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

This Committee must stop and take counsel so that its precipitate measures will not victimize nations and peoples who have been rendered helpless and voiceless by the consequences of war and by the remnants of colonialism. May I be allowed to repeat here the words with which my august Sovereign ended his appeal to the League of Nations when his nation was made a victim of fascist aggression? He said: "God and history will remember your judgements." We should be well advised, therefore, not to allow ourselves to be stampeded into any hasty conclusions that we might live to regret.

The extent of the measures we take has been made clear to us by the United States delegation when it says that today's B-47 bomber has an effect equal to all the bombs dropped by both sides in the Second World War. And this, as we have been told, is what the United States intends to scrap (ENDC/PV.199, p.15).

If we look at the New Times, Soviet edition, of 23 January 1963 we are alarmed at the declared escalation of armament by the NATO Powers; but with the lack of data from the Warsaw Pact Powers -- data which my delegation would appreciate having -- it is not possible to make comparisons. However, we can well imagine that lunar landings will not be achieved before an armaments equalization has been assured. We are aware that warheads are lined up in both camps, and supersonic missiles are looming in space, risking innocent lives of this and future generations. Are we to allow the European continent, which has been the scene of two catastrophic world wars in less than a generation, to proceed to a third catastrophe which we can only imagine in apocalyptic proportions?

We are therefore conscious of the urgency of our task, while realizing the care we must give to every step. We have before us in this Committee three steps that have been put to us in the form of concrete proposals.

The first is to finish the job left undone by the Moscow test-ban Treaty by banning all nuclear tests, including the subterfuge of underground tests. Perhaps that is the first step that could be taken by the Powers to prove the sincerity of their declaration on nuclear disarmament. The Ethiopian delegation does not see any reason why an agreement on those lines could not be coupled with a general agreement on non-proliferation.

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

The second proposal, which has been the subject of general consideration, is for a treaty on non-proliferation. We have been asked by the United Nations Disarmament Commission to ---

"... accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures;" (DC/225; ENDC/149).

It is the hope of my delegation that we shall not be placed in situations where we shall have to repeat the expressions of regret which the non-aligned States made at the last session of this Committee:

"The non-aligned delegations regret, however, that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/158)

In those circumstances the non-aligned delegations believed it was advantageous to state their basic approach to a non-proliferation treaty which could receive the support of the entire international community.

The third concrete proposal transmitted to us, which has universal importance, relates to the convening of a world disarmament conference. It is important, of course, that we should not lose any possibility of reaching agreement on collateral measures by paying undue attention to the United Nations resolution on a world disarmament conference (A/RES/2030 (XX); ENDC/162); but we cannot help noticing that the references during the General Assembly deliberations on the resolution to a "treaty" or a "convention", "measures related to non-proliferation", "steps to general and complete disarmament", all imply attention to the general issues of disarmament and have been written with the prospect of a world disarmament conference on the horizon.

The Ethiopian delegation welcomes that prospect, and refers to that resolution only to express its support for the attainment of an agreement on the composition, agenda and site of such a conference, which seem to be the unresolved questions. We are primarily concerned here to see that our negotiations are not such as will need to be undone by the international community.

We hope also that the Secretary-General of the United Nations will regard the resolution as an adequate mandate to extend a welcome to attend the conference, directly or indirectly, to all those who uphold the principles of the United Nations

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

and to those who have to be introduced to its binding pledges for peace and humanity. May I here recall the words of Mr. Litvinov, whose historic vigilance against war is so well remembered in this Palais des Nations? On 17 March 1936, at the League of Nations Assembly, Mr. Litvinov was obliged to intervene after Germany had violated the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and Italy had invaded Ethiopia. He said: "One cannot struggle for the collective organization of security without adopting collective measures against breaches of international obligations." And he concluded: "We are for the creation of security for all the nations of Europe, and against the half-peace which is not peace at all but war." ^{1/}

May I add only one other quotation, to bridge the gap between the League of Nations and the United Nations? It is a quotation from one of the architects of the United Nations, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and I quote it extensively only because of its immediate relevance to our times. He said:

"I have said to every nation in the world something to this effect:

"1. Let every nation agree to eliminate over a short period of years, and by progressive steps, every weapon of offense in its possession, and to create no additional weapons of offense. This does not guarantee a nation against invasion unless you implement it with the right to fortify its own border with permanent and nonmobile defenses; and also with the right to assure itself through international continuing inspection that its neighbours are not creating or maintaining offensive weapons of war.

"2. A simple declaration that no nation will permit any of its armed forces to cross its own borders into the territory of another nation. Such an act would be regarded by humanity as an act of aggression and as an act, therefore, that would call for condemnation by humanity.

"3. It is clear, of course, that no such general agreement for the elimination of aggression and of the weapons of offensive warfare would be of any value to the world unless every nation, without exception, entered into the agreement by solemn obligation. If then such an agreement were signed by a great majority of the nations on the definite conditions that it would go into effect only when signed by all the nations, it would be a

^{1/} League of Nations Official Journal. Seventeenth year, No. IV (part 1), 91st (extraordinary) session of the Council.

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

comparatively easy matter to determine which nations in this enlightened time are willing to go on record as belonging to the small minority of mankind which still believes in the use of the sword for invasion of and attack upon their neighbours.

"I did not make this suggestion until I felt assured, after a hard-headed practical survey, that the temper of the overwhelming majority of all men and women in my own country, as well as those who make up the world's population, subscribes to the fundamental objective I have set forth and to the practical road to that objective. The political leaders of many of these peoples interpose, and will interpose, argument, excuse, befogging amendment -- yes, and even ridicule. But I tell them that the men and women they serve are so far in advance of that type of leadership that we could get a world accord on world peace immediately if the people of the world spoke for themselves." ^{2/}

This is but an extension of the challenge of President Wilson in proposing that governments should change from government by war to government by peace for their peoples. In the paragraphs I have quoted we have a blueprint which the Conference might peruse. It brings into focus the universality of a conference on world disarmament, the essential issues of the agenda of such a conference, and the hope for a better future.

Regarding the contacts across the different "curtains", my delegation believes that these curtains are not impenetrable given the good offices of many governments. As the world has seen, even certain individuals, like Field-Marshal Montgomery, have been able to penetrate the so-called "bamboo curtain". We hear even that the city of Vienna has offered itself as the site for the conference. That is a city where the old and the new are blended, the tradition of the Holy Roman Empire and the hospitality offered to the Atomic Energy Agency. And, certainly, as it is in the safest demilitarized zone, holding the conference there should give rise to the smallest number of those excuses to which President Roosevelt referred.

My delegation has felt it incumbent to review the content of General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX) on the question of convening a world disarmament conference, which endorses the proposal adopted by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries at their Conference in Cairo in 1964 (A/5763), because of the necessity

^{2/} On our Way. By Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1933. New York: The John Day Company. Pages 137, 138.

(Mr. Aberra, Ethiopia)

that this Committee should relate its negotiations on non-proliferation to the prospect of the forthcoming world conference on general and complete disarmament.

The Ethiopian delegation regrets, however, to note the absence of the leaders of delegations of some of the nuclear Powers, who have had to leave us for some time owing to prior commitments. We hope that the impasse in which we have arrived on the problem of what has become known to us as the problem of the loop-hole -- that of the escalation of armament in the centre of Europe -- will not deter or delay the participants in this Conference from the urgent task of finding a way out of deadlock, giving due regard to the rights and duties of the peoples of the region.

I have referred in my statement to the race between man's destructive and constructive powers. Science has broken the bars to unleash on the world boundless and rampant nuclear monsters; but it has also reduced our national boundaries to a common boundary of humanity which we around this table are pledged to defend. Let us not forget, therefore, that we who are called to play our part in the task of the salvation of humanity and civilization are also engaged in a race with time. Our best chance for negotiation may well be to accelerate international co-operation for man's progress in technology in the service of verification and control of nuclear proliferation and armament escalation. We have also a duty to bridge the gap between man's modern nuclear dilemma and his inadequate organization for international control and enforcement of any agreement we may reach. We cannot afford, therefore, to jettison such vital considerations from this Conference or from conferences to come.

The principal pre-condition for the work of this Committee remains, however, that we address ourselves to our task of reaching a comprehensive non-proliferation agreement with urgency, integrity and dedication, so that it may serve mankind with universal application.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, permit me, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, sincerely to welcome among us the new leader of the Burmese delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, Ambassador Maung Maung, and to wish him great success in his responsible work. We are convinced that Ambassador Maung Maung and the whole Burmese delegation under his leadership will make a positive contribution to the work of our Committee.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

May I, first of all, draw attention to one serious problem which, in the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, has a direct bearing on the work of our Committee and on the problem of ensuring the peace and security of the peoples? I refer to the accident over the coast of Spain involving a United States B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons, in which four hydrogen bombs fell on Spanish territory and in coastal waters. There was radioactive contamination of the environment as a result of damage to at least one of these bombs.

Attempts are being made in United States official circles to minimize the significance of this serious incident, which has caused extreme alarm not only in Spain, but throughout the world. In our Committee also we have seen how, despite the gravity of the accident, the United States delegation has attempted to minimize its possible consequences and has even asserted that the Soviet Union is allegedly trying to use this "incident" merely for propaganda purposes. This is not the first occasion on which the socialist countries have been accused of propaganda as soon as they have drawn attention to activities threatening the general peace, and when those bearing the responsibility for such activities have had no other arguments to hand.

How can one speak of propaganda seeing that the Spanish Government itself, which has obviously had serious grounds for doing so, has prohibited as a result of this last incident all flights of United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over Spanish territory? Many facts testifying to radioactive contamination of the coastal area are admitted even by the United States press. How otherwise, for example, are we to understand a report in the New York Times of 19-20 February 1966 to the effect that hundreds of American servicemen, including special teams for the elimination of the consequences of radioactive contamination, were sent to the area of the B-52 crash; that Spanish peasants were compelled to leave their fields; that crops were burnt over a wide area; and that special American units working in special protective clothing have even removed earth from the area where the hydrogen bombs fell?

Responsible United States public figures are attempting in connexion with the crash of the strategic bomber over Spain to deny any possibility of danger arising

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

as a result of such incidents, stressing the function of the safety system of nuclear weapons, in which it is alleged that electronic and other "locks" should reliably prevent the explosion of these weapons. But who can assert that there is absolutely no possibility of a number of unforeseen circumstances arising which might render these "locks" completely valueless?

Such an unforeseen circumstance might, for example, arise if a nuclear bomb were to fall into the sea and not be found. The latest reports from official United States sources do admit that there is very little hope of finding the United States hydrogen bomb which fell into the Mediterranean Sea more than a month ago. This is bound to cause serious concern to all of us. One can imagine the extent to which the water might be contaminated as a result of corrosion or some mechanical damage to the casing of the bomb. In that case no "locks" or control devices would be of any avail, and those who make military plans for unforeseen circumstances would be powerless.

The rising wave of protest against flights of United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, and the great concern as to the possible consequences of the latest serious incident over Spain, show that the peoples realize the danger inherent in this practice of the United States armed forces. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore deems it to be its duty to raise its voice in protest against these flights and to associate itself with the proposal of the USSR (ENDC/167) that the Committee should call for the immediate cessation of flights by bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of the national borders of States.

After several weeks of general debate our Committee is now passing on to discussion of the question of drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) of the United Nations General Assembly. The Czechoslovak delegation expresses its complete satisfaction at this development. We believe that a completely adequate basis has already been created for concrete negotiations.

The negotiations that have taken place so far on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have clearly shown the great significance that has been attached in the last few years to the adoption of effective measures in this

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

field, and the positive role which the adoption of a treaty would play in efforts aimed at improving the general world situation. Nevertheless, the negotiations which have taken place so far and the documents which have been submitted also show the serious divergences which exist in the approach of the respective sides to solution of this question.

These positions, particularly the positions of the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States, have been most faithfully reflected in the draft treaties submitted by the two Governments (ENDC/152,164). Both drafts are a definite basis for the mutual comparison and clarification of positions in the course of subsequent negotiations, which should end with the elaboration of an appropriate draft treaty on non-proliferation. At our last meeting some delegations already took the first steps in this direction by analysing and comparing some of the provisions of both drafts. The Czechoslovak delegation considers that this way of acting is the one most likely to lead to the achievement of progress and to concrete results in our work.

In this respect we regard as particularly important the statement made by the representative of the USSR, Mr. Tsarapkin (ENDC/PV.241, pp. 30 et seq.), which was aimed mainly at clarifying and solving the important questions of non-proliferation formulated in articles I and II of the two draft treaties. These articles are the core of the problems of non-proliferation. They contain the basic provisions upon which depend the accomplishment of the task laid down in resolution 2028 (XX): the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which, in conformity with the first principle of this resolution, would not leave any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.

The difference in the approaches of the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation is most clearly manifested in these two articles of both draft treaties. Whereas the Government of the USSR adopts in its draft a consistent position of principle which does not permit of any exceptions, the draft submitted by the Government of the United States suffers from serious defects and omissions precisely in regard to the very core of the whole problem of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

These weak points are due to the existence of an ambivalent approach on the part of the United States and the other Western Powers to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation. The United States draft shows once again that the Western Powers are trying to adapt and to subordinate measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to certain concepts in the field of nuclear armaments, to concepts which certain circles in some of the States members of NATO have been discussing and juggling with for a long time.

A number of facts which the delegations of the socialist countries have already pointed out show that the gist and true meaning of these plans is the indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons as a means by which some non-nuclear Powers -- in particular the Federal Republic of Germany -- would be given access in one form or another to nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. These States would thus be afforded the possibility of participating in the control of nuclear weapons and in taking decisions concerning these weapons which are at present under the control of the nuclear Powers members of NATO, and in particular the United States and the United Kingdom.

The tendency to isolate these NATO plans from the scope of the treaty on non-proliferation was last, and most frankly, formulated in the statement by the representative of Italy at our meeting of 10 February. Mr. Cavalletti then stated:

"The military arrangements and collaborations of the alliances, whether conventional or nuclear, would be neither weakened nor interrupted by a non-proliferation agreement". (ENDC/PV.239, p.13)

In connexion with this statement the Czechoslovak delegation deems it necessary to make a number of comments. First, there can be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty is not aimed at the dissolution of existing military alliances. Nor is its purpose to interfere in the activity or internal affairs of these alliances. However, this premise, of course, remains valid only as long as their activity does not affect the field of proliferation of nuclear weapons. As soon as any actions within the framework of military groupings led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, they would naturally become incompatible with a treaty on measures to prevent proliferation.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

It is precisely this danger that is inherent in the plan for the integration of nuclear armament, various versions of which have for long been a subject of discussion among some of the States members of NATO. The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the delegation of the other socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out that the taking of such steps is being insisted upon primarily by the Federal Republic of Germany, whose Government is striving ever more intensively to secure its participation in nuclear armament within the framework of NATO.

This conduct of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is in profound contrast to the policy pursued by the Government of the other German sovereign State, the German Democratic Republic, in respect of European security and disarmament and particularly in respect of the nuclear disarmament of both German States. The position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was formulated once again and quite unequivocally in the statement which it sent on 7 February 1966 to the two co-Chairmen of our Committee and which was circulated as a Conference document. In this statement we read:

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic solemnly declares to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that it **is** ready to enter into such a commitment, binding under international law, on the renunciation of nuclear weapons, provided that the West German Government expresses the same readiness.

"At the same time, the Government of the German Democratic Republic calls on the Government of the West German Federal Republic to make a similar statement to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and thus remove an essential obstacle which is preventing a successful completion of the preparations for a strict world-wide non-proliferation treaty". (ENDC/168, pp.4,5)

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

However, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany pays no heed to the appeals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. On the contrary, in response to these appeals and to the ever-increasing pressure of public opinion and of the governments of the overwhelming majority of States for the speediest possible conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty which would consistently close all channels and possibilities for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to increase its pressure in the field of nuclear armament within the framework of NATO. Its claims in this direction are becoming ever bolder and are being pressed with ever greater insistence.

Thus, for example, the statement made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany last November concerning its programme mentions that an end should be put to the situation in NATO whereby -

"... individual members of the alliance possess their own nuclear weapons while others do not have them. The members of the alliance should participate in nuclear defence in accordance with the extent of the threat to which they are exposed, and with the share of commitments assumed by them."

The statement goes on to mention that the Federal Republic of Germany is thinking of the creation of a joint nuclear organization within the framework of NATO. In December of last year, in connexion with the preparation for the visit of Chancellor Erhard to the United States, a member of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the Federal Republic intended to submit specific proposals regarding a joint nuclear force.

Similarly, the West German Minister, Mr. Krone, stated in an article published in the Press and Information Bureau Bulletin of the Federal Government on 15 January 1966: "What our security mainly requires is a participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the important atomic decisions of the alliance." In this connexion he was of the opinion that: "Therefore it also does not suffice for the Federal Republic of Germany only to lay claim to the right to veto the use of nuclear weapons from German territory. A solution that is constructive must be found."

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

As for the position in regard to a non-proliferation treaty, Minister Krone states in the same article that the Federal Republic of Germany "must attach importance to this: that through a possible international agreement of this sort the way to a European atomic force is not blocked."

Lastly, in an article published on 1 December last year in the weekly journal Aussenpolitik und Zeitgeschichte the demand is made that politically and militarily influential NATO States should be given the status of "semi-nuclear Powers", which would be guaranteed the right to a say in the taking of decisions concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

In regard to a non-proliferation treaty the Government of the German Democratic Republic has adopted a clear position with which all members of our Committee have been acquainted in its statement mentioned above. But where the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, the Committee has not so far had the possibility of acquainting itself with that Government's point of view on this subject. True, the representatives of the Western Powers are continually assuring us that the Federal Republic of Germany is not seeking participation in nuclear armament, or to acquire nuclear weapons, or to gain access to them within the framework of NATO. But we consider that the members of the Committee would be glad if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany also stated its position in regard to the problems of non-proliferation and the projected treaty as unequivocally as the Government of the German Democratic Republic.

The effort to adapt and limit a possible treaty so as to leave open the way for the implementation of measures aimed at integrating nuclear armaments in NATO is indicative of the whole approach of the Western Powers to the question of non-proliferation. This striving is manifested above all in the continually repeated and emphasized attempts to limit the prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons solely to their acquisition or to their transfer into the independent national control of States not yet possessing nuclear weapons, to prevent new States acquiring the independent right to take decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The constantly-repeated and ever more openly advanced claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to participation in a joint nuclear force and in the control of nuclear weapons and the taking of decisions on their use within the framework of NATO show, however, that there are other, indirect, ways and means of proliferating nuclear weapons.

This fact must not in any case be left out of account or under-estimated. On the contrary, these indirect ways of proliferation must also be quite securely and hermetically sealed. Otherwise a treaty on non-proliferation could not fulfil its purpose.

There is no need to stress particularly the danger of direct proliferation of nuclear weapons, of their acquisition or transfer into the direct control of individual States. The need to block such a path is, however, also recognized in the draft treaty submitted by the representative of the United States. Equally dangerous, and in many respects even more dangerous, is the indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons, of which the plans at present under discussion in NATO are a practical example. This approach would make it possible in the future for the non-nuclear States in NATO, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, to participate in control and in the taking of decisions regarding the use of the vast nuclear potential of the present nuclear Powers in NATO, and regarding the use of this potential in a possible armed conflict.

This argument is not a purely theoretical hypothesis. Already at the inception of plans for the integration of nuclear armaments in NATO one of the main arguments put forward by those who are seeking to implement these plans was the fear that at a critical moment the United States of America might draw back from the use of nuclear weapons in a possible conflict in Europe. One of the main arguments which is used to justify the need for the participation of Western European countries in nuclear armament within the framework of NATO is precisely the desire to afford these States the possibility of opposing this "danger".

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

These grave facts show that it is not only the direct acquisition of nuclear weapons or their transfer into the independent national control of other States that is incompatible with the prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also such indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons as would lead to the creation of some third category of States which would, within the framework of military alliances, participate in nuclear armament, in the planning, control and decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons which the nuclear Powers members of the respective alliances now have at their disposal.

This is a point that has been repeatedly referred to by the representatives of the socialist countries, and was also mentioned by the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, in his statement at the meeting of the Committee held on 15 February (ENDC/PV.240, p.16). An effective and realistic non-proliferation treaty can be concluded only if it ensures equal conditions for all States and does not discriminate against some and leave others in a more advantageous position. There are no valid reasons why the non-nuclear States in military groupings should enjoy any privileges whatever in regard to nuclear armament vis à vis the other non-nuclear States that are not members of such alliances.

Hitherto in our negotiations some delegations have expressed the opinion that in the question of non-proliferation too much stress is laid on Europe, that the interests and aspects which are at present specific to Europe have too much influence on the negotiations. The representative of the People's Republic of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn, referred to this in his statement of 3 February, when he expressed the point of view of the Polish delegation on this subject (ENDC/PV.237, p.2). I should therefore merely like to add a few words to this.

The Czechoslovak delegation, like the delegations of the other socialist States, by no means restricts the problem of non-proliferation solely to Europe. We are far removed from not duly heeding or from underestimating the interests of the States of the other continents in the solution of this question. We quite firmly believe that the interests of these States must be respected to the utmost, that their positions and views on this subject must be fully taken into consideration. In this connexion I should like to emphasize that the Czechoslovak delegation hopes that the delegations of these States will, by their active intervention, help to

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

achieve agreement on a non-proliferation treaty that would ensure a really consistent solution of this question on a world-wide scale.

However, in seeking such a solution we should not forget that in Europe at the present time -- from the point of view of a non-proliferation treaty -- there is a special situation brought about by plans for the integration of nuclear armaments, in other words by plans for the indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. This circumstance inevitably has an effect of principle on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty on a world-wide scale. The danger of indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military groupings is at present concentrated mainly in Europe. However, this does not mean that it affects only Europe. On the contrary, this danger is a general one in extent and significance. It is in the interests of all States that in a non-proliferation treaty this question should be consistently solved so that the possibility of indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military groupings should be excluded once and for all throughout the world.

These are the considerations on which the draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/164) submitted by the representative of the USSR to the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly is based. The first two articles of this draft contain clear provisions the adoption of which would exclude both direct and indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. The wording of these provisions is quite clear and unambiguous and leaves no loophole or possibility for evading the obligations which States would assume under the treaty.

In this connexion I should like to dwell briefly on the proposal which you, Mr. Chairman, submitted on behalf of the Canadian delegation in your statement of 17 February: that before proceeding to specific negotiations on a draft non-proliferation treaty, certain general concepts should be previously defined so that the individual governments -- potential parties to the treaty -- should have a clear idea of the obligations which they would assume under it (ENDC/PV.241, pp.14 et seq.). The Czechoslovak delegation fully recognizes the need to define clearly and unambiguously the individual concepts to be used in drafting a non-proliferation treaty. But we ask ourselves the question: What would be the most suitable approach to the solution of this problem? Ought we at present to try to

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

seek a general definition of certain concepts before we begin the actual negotiations on a draft treaty, or would it be more correct to define these concepts in the specific context of the treaty in connexion with the discussion of the corresponding provisions?

In our view, the demand for the prior definition of certain general concepts would in fact mean returning to the general debate. It seems to us that this stage has already been passed in the Committee's negotiations. The general debate on the problems of non-proliferation, to which much time and attention has been devoted in our Committee and to some extent also in the session of the United Nations General Assembly, has already been completely exhausted. For this reason we consider it correct and in conformity with the present conditions for the Committee to proceed to discuss a draft treaty on non-proliferation article by article. We are convinced that such a concrete discussion is the most appropriate basis for further clarification of the point of view of individual States and for the achievement of progress in our negotiations.

The correctness of our position that the present stage of the negotiations does not require the prior definition of various general concepts is also shown, in our opinion, by the following example. In your statement on 17 February, Mr. Chairman (ibid., pp.15,16) and also in other statements of representatives of the Western delegations, there appears from time to time a request for a more precise definition of what the socialist States understand by the concept of the "access" of other States to nuclear weapons. This is a concept that frequently appears in the statements of the delegations of the socialist States, but also in the statements of other delegations, including the delegations of the Western countries.

In regard to the socialist States, it seems to us that there is no lack of clarity concerning what they understand by this concept. Its content and meaning are precisely and, in our opinion, unambiguously formulated and defined in articles I and II of the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation. These provisions provide every potential party to the treaty on non-proliferation with a sufficiently clear idea of the obligations that would be assumed under this treaty.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

We therefore consider that any prior definition of the concept of "access" to nuclear weapons is quite superfluous from the point of view of the negotiations on a draft treaty on non-proliferation. In the actual draft treaty submitted by the Government of the USSR the word "access" is not used at all. But the draft quite clearly defines the individual obligations which the States concerned would have to assume. The general concept of "access" is used by the delegations of the socialist countries in their statements mainly for practical reasons in order to avoid repeated detailed enumeration of the relevant obligations contained in articles I and II of the Soviet draft treaty. Therefore the demand for prior agreement on the definition of the concept of "access" to nuclear weapons from the point of view of the negotiations on a draft treaty on non-proliferation is, in our view, devoid of practical meaning.

In conclusion, I should like once again to refer briefly to an important matter relating to the negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hitherto considerable attention has been paid in the course of these negotiations, particularly by the non-aligned States, to the question of ensuring the security of non-aligned States that would assume an obligation under a treaty on non-proliferation. The Czechoslovak delegation considers that this position is fully justified. A serious problem is concerned which must be solved within the framework of a treaty on non-proliferation in a way which would, to the greatest possible extent, correspond to the interests of the non-nuclear States. There is full justification for the requirement that, in connexion with the assumption of obligations under a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear States should be afforded maximum, but at the same time tangible, real and effective, guarantees of their security.

The Czechoslovak delegation considers that the position of the Soviet Government expressed in the message sent to our Committee by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin (ENDC/167), is an important step in this direction. As we know, in this message the Soviet Government has expressed its willingness to include in a draft treaty on non-proliferation a provision prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States that are parties to the treaty and have no nuclear weapons in their territory. We consider that the position of the Soviet Government creates a suitable basis for the solution of this important question.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

This is also shown by the positive appreciation which this proposal of the Soviet Government has been given by the delegations of the non-aligned States that have so far taken part in the discussion.

A reference to the guaranteeing of the security of non-nuclear States is also contained in the message of President Johnson of the United States to our Committee dated 27 January 1966 (ENDC/165, p.2) in which there is formulated in a very general way a promise to give "strong support" against the threat of nuclear blackmail. If one compares the position of the USSR and the position of the United States on the basis of both messages, the comparison is in our opinion completely in favour of the position of the Soviet Government, which is based on the premise that the non-proliferation treaty should contain a clearly-worded provision on this subject. In contrast to this, it is not clear whether the promise of "strong support" to which President Johnson refers in his message would be reflected in the non-proliferation treaty, and if so in what way. Until this question has been clarified there is, in our opinion, no real basis for a businesslike evaluation of the position of the United States on this important subject.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I should like to make some remarks in my capacity as representative of Canada.

The representative of Czechoslovakia referred to some comments I had made at the 241st meeting in regard to the procedure we should adopt in undertaking the actual work of developing the text of a treaty on non-proliferation. Perhaps because of some slight difference of meaning between what I said in English and the Russian interpretation thereof, the representative of Czechoslovakia stated that I had thought we should settle certain considerations before going into the detailed discussion of articles; that, he thought, would bring us back to the general debate on non-proliferation, which would not be a good way to move forward.

I did mention some of the problems that we should have to deal with; but I did not necessarily mean, in speaking of those particular problems, that we should have to settle them before we started to examine the texts of the existing draft treaties before us. What I did say, if I may quote from the record of that meeting, was:

"In the opinion of my delegation, it will be essential to incorporate into the body of the eventual treaty clear-cut definitions of the various terms used in order that all the potential signatories may appreciate fully what it is that they are undertaking." (ENDC/PV.241, p.15)

(The Chairman, Canada)

I do not believe that anyone would disagree with the proposition that we ought to know what meaning we attach to words in our negotiations.

The representative of Czechoslovakia, following the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union at the previous meeting (ibid, pp.30 et seq.), said in effect that the definition of "access" could be a negative one -- that is to say, access is what non-nuclear nations will not have if they accept all the prohibitions in article II of the Soviet draft treaty. I think that we can ponder that definition.

I note also that in the latter part of his statement the representative of Czechoslovakia seemed to wish to have a more precise definition of "guarantees", "strong support" and other terms of that kind. This, I think, illustrates the desirability of our defining our terms as we go along. I do not necessarily imply by that that we ought to continue the general debate until we have defined those terms. The Canadian delegation would be quite willing -- if my understanding of the suggestion of the Czechoslovak representative is correct -- to enter into an article-by-article examination of the draft treaties that are before the Committee, at any time that the rest of the Committee is ready to do so.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 242nd meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

